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Abstract 
 
In this paper we intend to analyse, from a 
cryptographic perspective, a particular audio 
watermarking technique based on the Complex 
Spectral Phase Evolution (CSPE) algorithm. We 
will investigate the scheme mathematically 
(through the domains of practical cryptography 
and information security), theoretically 
(determining the characteristics of the scheme to 
evaluate its strengths and weaknesses) and 
experimentally (evaluating the results of the 
algorithm with different inputs, keys and variables 
to see if the technique has practical potential). We 
will investigate whether the technique replicates 
characteristics of Perfect Secrecy, a One-Time 
Pad, Random Oracle and the Avalanche effect. 
We will show how the CSPE audio watermarking 
scheme under investigation compares to current 
similar encryption techniques. Finally, we will 
outline possible areas to improve the technique 
and provide recommendations that will increase 
the security of the system so that it may be used in 
the fields of covert communication, steganography 
and cryptography. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Steganography, defined as “the art of concealing a 
message, image or file within another message, 
image or file”, [1] is derived from the Greek 
words steganos, meaning “protected”, and 
graphei, meaning “writing”. This concept, a form 
of information hiding, has been widely used 
throughout history. Herodotus, a historian of 
ancient Greece, tells the story of a message being 
tattooed on a slave’s head, hidden by the growth 
of his hair and exposed by the message carrier 
advising the intended recipient to shave his head 
again. The message allegedly carried a warning to 
Greece about Persian invasion plans. While there 
are drawbacks to this method, it highlights the 
early use of Steganography to hide information. 
 
Audio watermarking, a technique whereby data is 
hidden in an audio signal, is considered a form of 
Steganography through its ability to ‘hide’ the 
presence of other data. This is done by embedding 
(adding) the information to be watermarked ω, 
within a host audio signal s, to produce a 
watermarked signal s’. 
 
s + ω = s’   (1) 
 
Steganography can be combined with 
Cryptography, the art of protecting information by 
transforming it into an incomprehensible format, 
[2] to add an extra layer of security. This increases 
the strength and security during transmission; 
even if the presence of the message is discovered, 
it will be harder to understand. 
 
In this paper, cryptographic concepts will be 
investigated and discussed to evaluate the relative 
strength and security of this CSPE based audio 
watermarking cryptographic system. They 
include: 
 
 Perfect Secrecy: satisfied if the ciphertext  
(encoded message) gives no extra information 
about the original plaintext than already 
known about the plaintext. 
 One Time Pad (OTP): a type of encryption 
that, if used correctly, has been proven to be 
impossible to crack. 
 Random Oracle: a function mapping each 
unique input to a relative specific output. 
 Avalanche effect: a small change in the input 
will produce a large change in the output. 
 
The system analysed in this paper will be 
compared against RC4 to identify the similarities 
between both systems and highlight potential 
dangers to our system. RC4 is the most widely 
used software stream cipher at present and is used 
in protocols such as Secure Socket Layer (SSL) to 
protect internet traffic and Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP) to secure wireless networks. While 
remarkable for its simplicity and speed in 
software, RC4 has weaknesses that argue against 
its use in new systems. We will consider these 
weaknesses while evaluating our system. 
 
The CSPE-based audio watermarking algorithm 
will be discussed in more detail in Section 2. The 
system will be investigated mathematically and 
theoretically in Section 3. Experimental results 
will be presented in Section 4. We will also 
discuss the potential weaknesses and strengths of 
this system and provide recommendations in 
Section 5. 
 
 
2.0 CSPE Background 
 
The Complex Spectral Phase Evolution (CSPE) 
algorithm, introduced by Short and Garcia in [3], 
can be used to analyse and detect the presence of 
frequency components that exist in an audio 
signal. It has been shown in [4] that, due to the 
algorithms computationally efficient design, it 
provides a more accurate set of results than other 
signal decomposition techniques such as Discrete 
Fourier transform (DFT). 
 
2.1 Audio-based Covert Encryption System 
 
The CSPE algorithm can be used as the basis for 
an Audio-based Covert Encryption System 
(ACES) for security purposes, by introducing 
cryptographic aspects such as encryption (the 
process of transforming a message into a coded 
message) into the process. While [4] addressed the 
use of audio watermarking as a technique for 
content identification and tracking, the basic 
system in [4] can be adapted to provide a platform 
for covert communications and secret data 
transmission. The main principle of the encryption 
process is displayed in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Audio-based Encryption Process 
 
The signal intended as the cover or host audio is 
segmented into frames of uniform length 
depending on the length of the plaintext. The 
frame length is derived by dividing the length of 
the cover signal in samples (St) by the length of 
the plaintext in bits (Pl). This provides the 
maximum frame size (Fmax) required to embed the 
plaintext in the whole audio signal exactly once. 
 
St / Pl = Fmax    (2) 
 
Note, as explained in [4], that it is clearly possible 
to repeat a plaintext message multiple times 
within a cover audio signal to increase robustness 
and accuracy of recovery of the message. 
However, for the purpose of this paper, repeat 
embedding is not considered in any great detail 
primarily as the intended application domain is 
different and in view of the One Time Pad concept  
 
For each frame of the cover audio, an FFT (Fast 
Fourier transform) analysis is performed twice; 
firstly on the signal of interest (S0) and secondly 
on the same signal, but shifted one sample in time 
(S1). The FFT is an efficient algorithm to compute 
the DFT (Discrete Fourier transform) [5]. The 
DFT analyses frequency components present in a 
sample created from a function, such as an audio 
signal.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the CSPE algorithm proposed 
by Short and Garcia in [3]. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Flow Diagram of CSPE 
 
To improve the accuracy of the FFT, both samples 
are first passed through a window. This helps to 
minimise the problem of spectral leakages (energy 
from one frequency leaks into another frequency) 
in the sample. Then, by multiplying the initial 
FFT spectrum by the complex conjugate of the 
sample-shifted FFT spectrum, a frequency 
dependent function is formed from which the 
exact values of the frequency components in the 
signal can be detected.  
 
The algorithm produces a graph with a staircase-
like appearance, illustrated in Figure 3, where the 
horizontal parts indicate the exact frequency 
components in the signal. 
 
 
Figure 3: Output of the CSPE process for a multi-
frequency signal and a NutallC3 window 
 
It can be seen clearly from Figure 3, that the 
signal analysed contains frequency components at 
250 Hz, 350 Hz, 450 Hz, 550 Hz, 650 Hz, 750 Hz 
and 850 Hz. 
 
In order to ‘embed’ data, the user first chooses a 
value, for example, an arbitrary value within the 
human hearing range (≈ 100 Hz – 20,000 Hz), 
known as the user-defined Personal Identification 
Number (PIN). The PIN is used as a reference 
value during the ACES process for each frame so 
that the closest frequencies above and below the 
reference value (user-defined PIN), that actually 
exist in the cover signal, can be identified. Note 
that there is no need for a frequency component to 
exist which matches the user-defined value. 
 
The magnitudes (the size of the sound wave, a 
value between 0 and 1) of the obtained 
frequencies are then compared using the following 
rules.  
 
A > B = 1;     B > A = 0   (3) 
 
According to this rule (3), if the magnitude value 
of the component above the user’s reference value 
(A) is greater than the magnitude value of the 
component below the reference value (B), then a 
‘1’ would be produced. Conversely, if the 
magnitude value of the component below the 
reference value (B) is greater than the magnitude 
value of the component above the reference value 
(A), a ‘0’ is produced. 
 
The reverse of rule (3) can be chosen by the user, 
however, such that; 
 
A > B = 0; B > A = 1   (4) 
 
Comparing the components present in the output 
of the CSPE process on a frame by frame basis, 
and using rule (3) or (4) as required, a binary bit 
sequence is created, composed of ‘1’s and ‘0’s 
that represent the relationship between two 
components that exist in the frame, above and 
below the reference value. It is critical to note, 
however, that the components above and below 
the reference value are likely to be different in 
every frame when using real audio signals. 
 
 The sequence output from this analysis of the 
relationship between components in the cover 
signal is then applied to the plaintext binary bit 
sequence using bitwise ‘Exclusive OR’ (XOR). A 
bitwise XOR takes two bit patterns of equal length 
and performs the logical XOR operation on each 
pair of corresponding bits. The output in each 
position is 1 if only one of the pair of bits is a 1. It 
will be 0 if both are 1 or both are 0. This is 
equivalent to being 1 if the two bits are different, 
and 0 if they are the same. For the ACES system, 
this means that if the cover audio presents 
components that already represent a 1 and we 
want to embed a 1, nothing changes. Similarly, if 
the cover audio presents components that already 
represent a 0 and we want to embed a 0, nothing 
changes. However, if cover audio presents 
components that do not match the plaintext bit to 
be embedded (in other words, the pair of bits in 
the XOR are different), then we need to modify 
the cover signal to embed the plaintext bit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: XOR Truth Table 
 
In Figure 4, column ‘C’ represents the cover audio 
bit and column ‘P’ represents the plaintext bit. The 
final column is the result of the XOR operation. With 
a new binary bit sequence (essentially, the XOR 
result for each bitwise pair), we identify the 
components in the original audio signal need to be 
changed to embed the plaintext.  
 
If a ‘1’ is produced as a result of XOR, this means 
that we need to change the magnitude of 
component A in that frame so that it is less than 
the magnitude of component B. This process is 
repeated for every frame where the bitwise XOR 
produces a 1. We expect that half of the frames 
will require a change in magnitude, a point that 
will be addressed further on in the paper. When 
this task is complete, the component modification 
process will have ended and the plaintext will 
have been embedded in the signal, producing a 
cipher audio (audio equivalent of a ciphertext). 
 
 
2.2 Decryption 
 
The decryption process is much simpler than the 
encryption process. The recipient of the cipher 
audio needs to know various parameters to be able 
to decrypt the encoded message.  
 
These include the frame length, the user-defined 
PIN, the window length and the Rule. If the 
recipient is in possession of all of these 
parameters, they are then able to input them into 
the ACES system to retrieve the plaintext 
embedded in the audio signal by simply analysing 
the relationship between the components directly 
above and below the user defined reference value. 
The process is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Decryption Process 
 
 
 
3.0 Cryptology 
 
Cryptology, described as the study of 
cryptography and cryptanalysis (the art of code 
breaking), makes use of several different aspects 
from other fields (information theory, computer 
science) to evaluate the strength of a 
cryptosystem. In Section 3.1, we discuss some of 
these traits and characteristics. 
 
3.1.1 Perfect Secrecy 
 
Perfect Secrecy, a property brought about by 
Claude Shannon during WWII [6], implies that the 
ciphertext gives absolutely no information about 
the plaintext, except for the maximum possible 
length of the message. The aim of Perfect Secrecy 
is to make guessing the plaintext as hard to do 
given the ciphertext as it is without it. A 
cryptosystem has Perfect Secrecy if it satisfies the 
following three conditions. 
 
1. The cryptosystem is Shannon secure 
(knowing the ciphertext does not make it 
any easier to decipher). 
 
 
 
2. The cryptosystem is perfectly message 
indistinguishable. This means for every 
pair of plaintext messages, the 
probabilities that either message  
maps to a given ciphertext must be equal. 
 
 
C P C XOR P 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
0 1 1 
1 1 0 
 
3. The cryptosystem, with equal size 
spaces , is perfectly key 
ambiguous. This condition holds if and 
only if each key chosen is truly random 
and for all , there exists a 
unique key  such that . 
 
3.1.2 One-Time Pad 
 
The One-Time Pad (OTP) [7], derived from the 
Vernam cipher, was proven by Claude Shannon to 
have Perfect Secrecy. With One-Time Pads, each 
bit or character from the plaintext is encrypted, 
using modular addition, with a bit from a secret 
random key of the same length as the plaintext, 
resulting in a ciphertext. If the generated key 
satisfies certain conditions, it has been proven to 
be perfectly secure (shown below). These 
conditions are that the key is truly random, it is as 
large as or greater than the plaintext, it is never 
reused and it is kept secret. If all these conditions 
are met, then the ciphertext will be impossible to 
decrypt or break without knowing the key.  
 
Take any  and , where M = 
Message Space, C = Ciphertext Space 
 
Let . 
 
Note that: 
 
 
=  
=   
=   
=   
 
where  = length of message 
 
Since the equation is true for every , it 
follows that for every , we have: 
 
    =    
 
    =    
 
Therefore, this implies: 
 
=  
 
This establishes Perfect Secrecy of the One-Time 
Pad. 
 
3.1.3 Random Oracle 
  
A Random Oracle is a theoretical black box 
(system which can be viewed solely as having an 
input and an output but having no knowledge of 
its internal workings) in which there is one unique 
output per input. Theoretically, in our case, the 
input is the frame length, the PIN and the Rule; 
assuming the audio signal is a constant in this 
scenario. The black box would refer to the CSPE 
process and the output is the generated key. If the 
key is unique for each different input, and if 
repeating an input provides the same output, then 
our system will satisfy the properties of a Random 
Oracle. 
 
3.1.4 Avalanche Effect 
 
The Avalanche effect is a desirable quality in 
cryptographic algorithms. It is evident if, when the 
input is slightly changed (such as changing one 
bit) the output changes significantly (half the 
output bits change) [8]. If the cipher does exhibit 
the avalanche effect to a significant degree, it is 
also said to have good randomisation. The strict 
avalanche criterion (SAC) is a generalization of 
the avalanche effect. It is satisfied if, whenever a 
single input bit is complemented, 50% of the bits 
in the output sequence will change. 
 
3.1.5 Randomness 
 
Random tests are used to analyze the distribution 
pattern of numerical sequences. With stream 
ciphers, these sequences consist of just 1’s and 
0’s, also known as bit sequences. Random bit 
sequences possess a high measure of 
unpredictability. 
 
If you toss a coin up in the air ten times in a row, 
there is no way to predict how many times it will 
land on heads or tails. In information theory, 
entropy is a measure of disorder or, more 
precisely, unpredictability. A series of coin tosses 
is known to have zero entropy. If you have a bit 
sequence of length 16, it is said you have 16 bit 
entropy. In other words, you cannot consistently 
predict successfully 16 times whether the next bit 
is going to be a 1 or a 0. This is very important in 
the area of randomness. If an attacker can predict 
the next bit in your sequence, your system is 
considered insecure.  
 
In our case, we will be testing the generated keys 
to see if they are statistically random (contain no 
recognizable patterns or regularities). Statistical 
randomness, however, does not imply true 
randomness. True randomness is a property that 
cannot be created using a computer algorithm. If a 
bit sequence passes a statistical random test, it is 
said to be locally random (pseudo-random; 
appears to be random). Due to the fact that true 
randomness is difficult to assess, pseudo-
randomness is sufficient for most stream ciphers. 
 
The following three statistical random tests (also 
known as Hypothesis tests) were published by 
Kendall and Smith in the journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society in 1938. [9] 
 
1. Frequency Test: Number of 1’s and 0’s should 
be roughly equal. 
2. Serial Test: Number of two digit combinations 
(00, 01, 10, 11) should be roughly equal. 
3. Poker Test: Number of times subsequences of 
length ‘m’ occur in the full sequence should be 
roughly equal. 
 
Each test is designed to use Pearson’s chi-square 
table [10]; a statistical tool used to compare each 
tests chi-squared value with the corresponding 
chi-squared number from the table. According to 
the assigned degree of freedom (number of values 
in the final calculation of a statistic that are free to 
vary) for the test, the test passes if the tests chi-
squared value is less than the chi-squared from the 
table.  
 
3.2 Attacking the system 
 
An Attack is a successful or unsuccessful attempt 
at breaking part or all of a cryptosystem. The 
methods for attacking a stream cipher can be 
classified according to the information available to 
the cryptanalyst, the aim of the attack, or the way 
the attack is done. It is often assumed that the 
attacker has knowledge of the cryptographic 
algorithm, but not the key. As a result, due to the 
general algorithm often being publicly known, the 
confidentiality of the message depends on the 
secrecy of the key (Kerckoff’s law). 
 
Ciphertext-only Attack: An attack model for 
where the attacker is assumed to have access only 
to a set of ciphertexts. For this type of attack to be 
successful, the plaintext would need to have 
several bit repetitions. The various statistical 
techniques used for attacking the ciphertext are: 
 
(i) Frequency Analysis – Studying the rate of 
occurrences. 
(ii) Traffic Analysis - intercepting and examining 
messages in order to deduce information from 
patterns.  
(iii) Brute force Attack (Exhaustive Key Search) - 
systematically checking all possible keys until 
the correct key is found. This type of attack 
requires a large amount of computing power 
and a large amount of time to run. For the 
majority of encryption algorithms, a brute 
force attack is impractical due to the large 
number of possibilities. 
 
Known-plaintext Attack: The attacker has a set of 
ciphertexts to which he knows the corresponding 
plaintext and is at liberty to make use of them to 
try and uncover further secret information; 
typically, the key. 
 
Chosen-plaintext Attack: An attack model which 
presumes that the attacker has the capability to 
choose arbitrary plaintexts to be encrypted and 
obtain the corresponding ciphertexts. Any cipher 
that can prevent chosen-plaintext attacks is then 
also guaranteed to be secure against known-
plaintext and ciphertext-only attacks. The two 
distinguished forms of chosen plaintext attacks 
are: 
 
(i) Batch chosen-plaintext attack - the 
cryptanalyst chooses all plaintexts before any 
of them are encrypted. 
(ii) Adaptive chosen-plaintext attack - the 
cryptanalyst makes a series of interactive 
queries, choosing subsequent plaintexts based 
on the information from the previous 
encryptions. 
 
Chosen-ciphertext Attack: An attack model where 
the cryptanalyst gathers information, at least in 
part, by choosing a ciphertext and obtaining its 
decryption under an unknown key. The aim is to 
deduce the key. 
 
3.3 Similar Cryptographic Systems  
 
The RC4 algorithm, developed by Ron Rivest of 
RSA [11], is a shared key stream cipher algorithm 
that requires a secure exchange of a secret key. 
The algorithm is used identically for encryption 
and decryption as the data stream is simply 
XOR’ed with the pseudo-randomly generated key 
sequence.  
 
Several similarities exist between RC4 and our 
system. Both systems, if non-random keys are 
generated, will show vulnerability to attacks and 
highlight weaknesses in the system. RC4 is 
malleable which means that an adversary has the 
power to transform a ciphertext (e.g. by bit 
flipping) into another ciphertext, which would in 
practice, alter the plaintext decrypted. This attack 
is commonly known as a “Man in the Middle” 
attack. Fortunately, however, Man in the Middle 
attacks can be detected with the use of Message 
Authentication Code (MAC’s) and digital 
signatures.  
 
4.0 Experiments & Analysis 
 
A number of experiments were designed and 
carried out to identify the characteristics displayed 
by this system and whether or not certain desirable 
cryptographic properties were present. The 
majority of experiments were carried out using 
Matlab, our main programming tool, while others 
were tested via Eclipse, a Java programming IDE 
(Integrated Development Environment). All 
experiments were carried out using 128 bit 
sequences, the equivalent to 16 ASCII characters 
[12]. One hundred experiments were conducted on 
three different audio signals, each from a different 
genre (rap, pop/rock and house), for each set of 
input parameters (900 experiments). Three input 
parameters were used throughout the course of 
these experiments: 
 
(i) Random PIN, Constant Frame Length & 
Constant Plaintext 
(ii) Constant PIN, Reducing Frame Length & 
Constant Plaintext 
(iii)Random PIN, Reducing Frame Length & 
Constant Plaintext 
 
The results of these experiments were used to test 
for randomness, amongst other properties. The 
overall results show that the key was locally 
random (pseudo-random) 82.44% of the time, 
according to the statistical tests which were 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
As well as testing for randomness, the results of 
the aforementioned experiments were analysed to 
determine if the system displayed the 
characteristics of a Random Oracle. The output of 
the ACES algorithm, the generated key, was 
tested to identify if the key was unique for each 
different input. Based on the experiments carried 
out, it was ascertained that the output (key) was 
distinct for each input 100% of the time and that 
the key was never repeated for any different input 
tested. It was also noted that if the same input was 
used twice, then the same output would be 
achieved. This is an important trait of the Random 
Oracle model. 
 
Along with a random key and the Random Oracle 
model, another desirable cryptographic property 
that was tested for was the Avalanche effect. The 
same set of input parameters as used previously 
were chosen with a minor change made to one of 
the inputs progressively throughout each set of 
experiments. Firstly, the PIN was changed by 120 
Hz each time leading to changes in the key by 
between 41-60%, averaging 50.15%. Similarly, 
for the second set of experiments, the frame length 
was slightly altered each time by a change of 512. 
This resulted in a change in the key by between 
36-57%, averaging 47.4%. While the recorded 
averages are not overly large percentages, it still 
lends credence to the idea that this system displays 
certain positive attributes of the Avalanche effect. 
 
After the previously discussed experiments were 
completed, we wanted to verify the idea proposed 
earlier in the paper (Section 2) that 50% of the 
magnitudes of the original audio would require a 
change to be able to embed the plaintext into the 
signal. To do this, we modified the input into the 
ACES algorithm each time and recorded the 
number of 1’s that were present in the XOR result. 
It was calculated that the number of 1’s present in 
the XOR ranged between 35-67%, averaging 
50.09%, thus proving the proposed concept. 
 
Lastly, an experiment was written to test if the 
system was susceptible to a Chosen-Plaintext 
Attack. This was done by examining if any 
relationship existed between the plaintext and the 
XOR for a randomly generated key. The 
experiment was carried out on 3 audio signals 
with an average difference of 49%, ranging from 
39-64%, in the bits between the plaintext and 
XOR being recorded. Based on these results, we 
can conclude that there is no obvious relationship 
between the plaintext and the XOR. 
 
Experiment Sig 1 Sig 2 Sig 3 Average 
Randomness 83.33% 83.33% 80.66% 82.44% 
Random Oracle 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Avalanche Effect 
(Change in PIN) 
49.65% 50.45% 50.35% 50.15% 
Avalanche Effect 
(Frame Size change) 
47.73% 47.53% 46.94% 47.4% 
50% Magnitude 
Change 
49.83% 50.59% 49.86% 50.09% 
Chosen Plaintext 
Attacks 
48.05% 51.85% 47.1% 49% 
Figure 5: Full set of Results 
 
 
5.0 Evaluation & Recommendations 
 
With numerous sets of experiments having been 
completed, it has allowed us to identify where we 
feel the strengths and weaknesses of this system 
lie. Due to the attacker requiring specific 
information to decrypt the message, such as frame 
length, the PIN and the Rule, the complexity of 
this system is increased. This strengthens the 
security of the system thus making it harder to 
break. 
 
One of the major weaknesses of the system that 
became apparent to us was that the attacker would 
always know the length of the audio signal. 
However, as shown by (2), the attacker must know 
either the plaintext length to compute the frame 
size, or the frame size to compute the plaintext 
length. Due to neither of these being provided by 
the system, it makes the knowledge of the length 
of the audio signal redundant. This is also a 
strength of the system in the fact that, even if the 
attacker were to try and brute-force attack the 
system, he would not know what the length of the 
message was, thus reducing the likelihood of 
finding the correct plaintext amongst all the 
messages provided as a result of the brute-force 
attack. 
 
Along with the frame length being unknown, two 
other elements are also kept secret; the PIN and 
the Rule. Taking this into consideration, we feel 
that this system promotes a secure method of data 
hiding. Despite this, however, we are of the 
opinion that improvements can still be made to 
improve this system. 
 
(i) The plaintext could be encrypted before 
embedding it into the audio signal, for 
example, by using a hash function [13]. Due to 
the fact that each resulting message produced 
after a brute-force attack is equally likely to be 
the correct plaintext, the attacker can narrow 
down the list of messages by eliminating any 
messages that do not make any sense. If the 
message was encrypted beforehand, the 
attacker would have no way of confidently 
identifying the correct message, thus 
increasing the security of the message. 
 
(ii) Another enhancement to the system would be 
to use a signal made up of white noise. White 
noise is a type of random signal observed to 
have a flat spectrum over a defined frequency 
band (such as the range of human hearing), 
where the frequencies and magnitudes are 
random themselves. As the signal is created 
randomly, the attacker has no original signal to 
compare the cipher-audio to.  
 
Another way of implementing this concept 
would be to record a voice memo, or even 
something as natural as the noise of the wind, 
and use this audio signal as the basis for your 
encryption. Once the process is complete, you 
would then delete the voice memo, providing 
the attacker with no original to compare to. 
This mimics the characteristics of a OTP as 
the voice memo is used only once, and even if 
the exact same message was recorded a second 
time, the frequencies present would differ. 
 
(iii)Another way to increase the strength of this 
system would be to use, what the attacker 
assumes to be the original, an easily accessible 
audio signal. An example of this would be 
using a song from the charts or a well-known 
speech. Then, before starting the encryption 
process, you would alter your own private 
copy of the accessible audio signal, use the 
edited version for the process and then delete 
it. As such, because the attacker is unaware of 
the alteration, he may try to compare the 
cipher-audio to the accessible unedited 
original audio signal. Since it has been edited 
before encryption, there would be no way the 
attacker could compare the signals and 
confidently find the plaintext, and it would 
also serve to confuse the attacker. 
 
(iv) Instead of using a constant PIN for each 
frame, you could use either a constantly 
changing random PIN or a function to 
implement the PIN. The main drawback to a 
constantly changing random PIN per frame is 
that the intended recipient would need to know 
all of these PINs to decrypt the message, 
making it an unattractive proposal.  
 
We could use a function instead, however, for 
each individual digit of the PIN per frame. A 
PIN, as explained previously, is chosen by the 
user, and in this case the user also defines a 
function of that PIN. Each individual digit of 
the PIN is placed into the function for each 
different frame and this acts as a reference 
value for that frame. The recipient, or attacker, 
would need to know the function as well as the 
PIN, making the system more secure. Due to 
the size of the PIN compared to the amount of 
frames, the digits would repeat themselves. 
However, due to the frequency components 
constantly changing on a frame by frame 
basis, we do not believe that this would cause 
any patterns to emerge. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have presented a CSPE based audio 
watermarking cryptographic system that has been 
analysed mathematically, theoretically and 
experimentally. The results highlight that this 
system has similar characteristics to a One-Time 
Pad. It also contains certain desirable 
cryptographic properties such as the Random 
Oracle model and the Avalanche effect. Due to the 
fact that the key does not appear to be truly 
random according to our results, this system 
cannot be considered to satisfy perfect secrecy. 
We have also made recommendations that we feel 
would improve the system, allowing it to be used 
securely in the area of covert communications.  
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